The State of Utah v. Joshua Earl : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
The State of Utah v. Joshua Earl : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Gray; Attorneys for Appellee.
Catherine E. Lilly; Ralph W. Dellapiana; Lori Seppi; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for
Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Earl, No. 20020821 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4001
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOSHUA EARL, : Case No. 20020821 -CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Possession of Clandestine Laboratory 
Precursors and/or Equipment, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b) (2001), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Sheila McCleve presiding. 
LORI J. SEPPI (9428) 
CATHERINE E. LILLY (7746) 
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA (6861) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6 th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOSHUA EARL, : Case No. 20020821 -CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Possession of Clandestine Laboratory 
Precursors and/or Equipment, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b) (2001), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Sheila McCleve presiding. 
LORI J. SEPPI (9428) 
CATHERINE E. LILLY (7746) 
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA (6861) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
INTRODUCTION 1 
ARGUMENT 
A. EARL HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF 
THE SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 2 
1. Earl Has Standing to Challenge the Search Because He Was 
a Resident or Overnight Guest 2 
2. Even If Earl Was Not a Resident or Overnight Guest, He 
Still Has Standing As a Social Guest of the Lessee 5 
3. At the Very Least, Earl Has Standing To Challenge the 
Search of the Backpack Because He Owned the Backpack 8 
B. THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE BACKPACK DURING 
THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST WAS INADMISSIBLE 
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE 10 
1. This Issue Was Properly Preserved for Appeal 11 
2. The Search of Earl's Backpack Should Be Excluded As 
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Because it Was Achieved Through 
Illegal Entry 12 
CONCLUSION 17 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Aaaard v. Davton & Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Co.. 12 Utah 2d 
34, 361 P.2d 522 (Utah 1961) 2 
In re B.R.K.. 658 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 2003) 8 
Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590 (1975) 14 
Chesapeake & O. Rv. Co. v. Martin. 283 U.S. 209 (1931) 3 
Chicago. Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Howell. 401 
F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1968) 3 
Frierson v. State. No. 4D02-1875,2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 8291 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 4, 2003) 15 
Miller v. Columbia Trust Co.. 63 Utah 305,225 P. 609 (Utah 
1924) 3 
Minnesota v. Carter. 525 U.S. 83 (1998) 5, 6, 7, 8 
Minnesota v. Olson. 495 U.S. 91 (1990) 5 
Morton v. United States. 734 A.2d 178 (D.C. 1999) 7, 8 
Ouintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp.. 303 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 
2002) 3,4 
Rav v. State. 798 So. 2d 579 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) 11 
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.. Inc.. 2003 UT 23, 
473 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 1 
Sonnentheil v. Christian Moerlein Brewing Co.. 172 U.S. 401 
(1899) 3 
ii 
State v. Alvarez. 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994) 11 
State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) 14 
State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 14 
State v. DeArman. 774 P.2d 1247 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) 15 
State v. Ford. 778 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) 15, 16 
State v. Gagnon. 817 So. 2d 167 (La. Ct. App. 2002) 15 
State v. Griego. 933 P.2d 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 13 
State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 15 
State v. Holsate. 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 12 
State v. Kent. 20 Utah 2d 1,432 P.2d 64 (Utah 1967) 16 
State v. Kohl. 2000 UT 35, 999 P.2d 7 4 
State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 14 
State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) 16 
State v. Ortiz. 618 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa 2000) 8 
State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). rev'd on 
other grounds. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992) 6 
State v. Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289 (Utah 1995) 13 
State v. Trane. 2002 UT 97, 57 P.3d 1052 13 
Tisco Intermountain & State Insurance Fund v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 744 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987) 10 
iii 
Page 
United States v. Burnett. 890 F.2d 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 9 
United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338 (1974) 14 
United States v. Cross. No. 01-20020, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23363 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 12, 2001) 6 
United States v. Garzon. 119 F.3d 1446 (10th Cir. 1997) 9, 10 
United States v. Heath. 259 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2001) 6 
United States v.Higgins. 282 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2002) 8 
United States v.Robinson. 414 U.S. 218 (1973) 12, 13 
Vollmerv. State. 337 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) 15 
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co.. 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985) 3 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV, United States Constitution 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 16, 17 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution 4 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOSHUA EARL, : Case No. 20020821-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
The State argues the trial court correctly denied Joshua Earl's (Earl) motion to 
suppress because Earl did not have standing to challenge the search of the apartment or 
backpack and the search of Earl's backpack was justified as a search incident to arrest. 
See Aple. Brf. at 8, 13. However, the State's arguments fail because: (A) Earl had 
standing to challenge the legality of the search under the Fourth Amendment, and (B) the 
evidence seized incident to arrest was inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree.1 
1
 The State does not challenge several of Earl's claims. First, the State does not 
challenge Earl's claim that Sheila Gledhill (Gledhill) did not have actual or apparent 
authority to consent to the entry or search of the apartment. See Aplt. Brf. at 13; Aple. 
Brf. at 8. Accordingly, the State does not challenge Earl's argument that the officers 
entered the apartment illegally. See id Second, although the State challenges Earl's 
claim that the evidence was not admissible under the plain view doctrine, it offers no 
analysis or case law to support this challenge. See Aplt. Brf. at 24; Aple. Brf. at 8, 13; 
see also Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.. Inc.. 2003 UT 23,f46, 473 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 50 (noting the appellate courts "are not a depository in which [a party] may dump 
the burden of argument and research" (quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in 
original)). Third, the State does not challenge Earl's assertion that there were no exigent 
ARGUMENT 
A, EARL HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THE 
SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The State argues Earl does not have standing to challenge the legality of the 
search under the Fourth Amendment. See. Aple. Brf. at 13. However, the State's 
argument fails because: (1) Earl had standing as a resident or overnight guest; (2) even if 
Earl was not a resident or overnight guest, he still had standing as a social guest of the 
lessee; and (3) at the very least, Earl had standing to challenge the search of the backpack 
because he was its owner. 
1. Earl Has Standing to Challenge the Search Because He Was a Resident or 
Overnight Guest. 
The State argues the trial court correctly found Earl did not have standing as a 
resident or overnight guest because he did not present enough evidence to meet his 
"heavy burden" and the State rebutted the evidence he did present. Aple. Brf. at 14. 
However, Earl's uncontradicted testimony that he was a resident or overnight guest at the 
apartment was sufficient to establish standing under the Fourth Amendment. 
Although it is the fact finder's "prerogative to determine the weight to be given 
the testimony of witnesses," the fact finder "may not arbitrarily disregard competent, 
credible and uncontradicted testimony." Aagard v. Dayton & Miller Red-E-Mix 
Concrete Co.. 12 Utah 2d 34, 361 P.2d 522, 524 (Utah 1961) (determining trial court 
circumstances to justify the warrantless search of the apartment. See. Aplt. Brf. at 46; 
Aple. Brf. at 8. 
2 
was not "arbitrary or unreasonable in refusing to believe" a witness whose testimony was 
uncontradicted because it was "fraught with . . . frailties"); see also Sonnentheil v. 
Christian Moerlein Brewing Co., 172 U.S. 401, 408 (1899) (noting "jury had no right to 
arbitrarily disregard the positive testimony of unimpeached and uncontradicted 
witnesses"); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 254 (Utah 1985) 
(holding "trial court's refusal to give any consideration to the uncontradicted expert 
testimony of the engineer . . . constituted an abuse of discretion"); Miller v. Columbia 
Trust Co., 63 Utah 305, 225 P. 609, 611 (Utah 1924) (holding "trial court was not bound 
to give . . . full credence" to uncontradicted witness's testimony "on account of numerous 
omissions, uncertainties, and contradictions"). 
Specifically, a fact finder "is not 'at liberty, under the guise of passing upon the 
credibility of a witness, to disregard his testimony, when from no reasonable point of 
view is it open to doubt.'" Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 75 (1st 
Cir. 2002) (quoting Chesapeake & O. Rv. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 216 (1931)); see. 
also Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Rv. Co. v. Howell, 401 F.2d 752, 754 (10th Cir. 1968) 
(holding "testimony concerning a simple fact, capable of contradiction, not incredible, 
and standing uncontradicted, unimpeached, or in no way discredited by cross-
examination, must be permitted to stand"). In other words, although a fact finder may 
"reject testimony that is uncontradicted and unimpeached" when "credibility is at issue," 
it may only do so when the testimony is "improbable, inherently contradictory, riddled 
3 
with omissions, or delivered in a manner giving rise to doubts." Quintana-Ruiz . 303 
F.3d at 75-76. 
In this case, Earl presented sufficient evidence to establish himself as a resident or 
overnight guest at Jeremy Allen's (Allen) apartment. He testified that Allen was his 
stepbrother and friend. See R. 278:58. He also testified that he had been living with 
Allen since the beginning of October because Allen had given him permission to live 
there until he found another place to stay. See. id. at 58, 61. Finally, he testified that he 
kept his clothes in the bedroom closet and, although he did not pay rent, helped clean and 
buy groceries. See id. at 61. 
Although this testimony was not contradicted by any other witnesses or evidence 
presented at trial,2 the trial court found the testimony was not credible and provided no 
reasons for its finding. See. R. 129. The only reason that can be gleaned from the record 
is that the trial court rejected Earl's testimony because Earl was the defendant and had an 
interest in testifying as he did. However, a fact finder cannot reject a defendant's 
credibility based solely on the fact that he stands accused of a crime. See. State v. Kohl, 
2000 UT 35,^21 n. 4, 999 P.2d 7 ("A criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is a 
2
 The State argues Earl's testimony was contradicted by Gledhill's testimony that 
only Allen had permission to live at the apartment and that she called the police because 
she was afraid other men might be in the apartment. See. Aple. Brf at 15. However, 
Gledhill also testified that she only visited the apartment occasionally and she had given 
Allen permission to have visitors. See. R. 278:9, 19. Further, she clarified that she asked 
the police to accompany her not because she was afraid the other men in the apartment 
were present without her permission, but because she was afraid the other men in the 
apartment would threaten or harm her if she entered alone. See. idL at 19-20. 
4 
fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the presumption of 
innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair 
trial under our system of criminal justice." (Quotations and citations omitted)). 
2. Even If Earl Was Not a Resident or Overnight Guest, He Still Has Standing 
As a Social Guest of the Lessee. 
The State argues that Earl does not have standing as Allen's social guest because 
he "was merely a casual visitor." Aple. Brf. at 16-17. This argument fails because Earl 
was a social guest entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 
It is true, as the State claims, that the United States Supreme Court created a 
continuum of Fourth Amendment standing in Minnesota v. Carter. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).3 
See Aple. Brf. at 16. However, the State incorrectly applies Carter to the facts of this 
case. When determining where a case lies on the Carter spectrum, a court should 
consider whether the defendant had "a previous relationship with" the householder, 
whether there was "any other purpose to [the defendant's] visit" besides business, and 
whether the defendant enjoyed "a degree of acceptance into the household." Carter, 525 
3
 On one end of the spectrum is a person who obviously has standing because he 
was an overnight guest. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (citing 
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990) (holding defendant's status as overnight 
guest was sufficient to show legitimate expectation of privacy)). On the other end of the 
spectrum is a person who does not have standing because he is "merely present with the 
consent of the householder." Carter, 525 U.S. at 90. Although the facts of Carter fell 
"somewhere in between," the Supreme Court concluded the facts were nearer the "merely 
present" pole because the defendants' business at the apartment was "purely 
commercial," the defendants were only at the apartment a short time, and the defendants 
had no "previous connection" with the householder. Id. at 91. 
5 
U.S. at 90. 
For example, in United States v. Heath. 259 F.3d 522, 533 (6th Cir. 2001), the 
appellate court found standing because the defendant had a previous relationship with the 
householder since he was the householder's cousin, and he had acceptance in the 
household because he slept on the couch as much as once a week for two years and 
possessed a key. Similarly, in United States v. Cross. No. 01-20020, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23363, at *19 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 12, 2001), the court found standing even though 
the defendant did not store belongings at the residence and only stayed overnight 
occasionally because he had a previous relationship with the apartment owner through 
familial ties and he had acceptance into the household since he was allowed to use the 
common facilities at the apartment complex.4 
In this case, Earl established standing because he presented evidence to show he 
had a previous relationship with Allen, he had a purpose in visiting Allen besides 
business, and he had a degree of acceptance into the household. First, Earl presented 
evidence that he had a previous relationship with Allen. Allen and Earl were 
4
 Although State v.Rowe. 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other 
grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992), was decided before Carter, it applies factors 
seemingly identical to the factors applied in Carter to determine whether a defendant has 
standing. In Rowe, the Utah Court of Appeals found standing because the defendant had 
stayed overnight in the past and "felt secure enough in the home to remove her shoes, 
leave her purse beyond her view, and roam to rooms other than where her fellow guests 
were playing cards." Rowe, 806 P.2d at 735-36. Accordingly, although the State argues 
that Rowe's authority is "tenuous" because it was reversed on other grounds, Rowe/s 
authority has actually been strengthened by Carter and cases interpreting Carter. 
6 
stepbrothers and friends. See. R. 278:19, 58. They were close enough that, when officers 
entered the apartment before 8:00 a.m., Allen and Earl were sitting at the kitchen table 
together playing computer games. See idL at 14-15, 20-21, 27-29. Second, Earl 
presented evidence that he had a purpose in visiting Allen besides business. When 
officers entered the apartment, Earl and Allen were not engaging in any business 
transactions. See idL Instead, they were sitting at the kitchen table playing video games 
as any friends or stepbrothers would do. See. id. Third, Earl presented evidence to show 
he had a degree of acceptance in the household. Earl was welcome in the apartment 
during the early morning hours and felt comfortable enough to leave his backpack on the 
floor in a different room of the apartment while he played video games in the kitchen. 
See id at 14-15, 20-21, 22, 27-29. 
Furthermore, the State fails to consider Carter's plurality in its argument. In 
Carter, Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter and Breyer excepted from the majority opinion 
because they believed short-term guests were entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 
Carter, 525 U.S. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment), 106 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). Moreover, "the majority opinion depended on the concurrence of Justice 
Kennedy, who joined the opinion expressly because its reasoning' was 'consistent with 
[his] view that almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and 
hence protection against unreasonable searches, in their host's home.'"5 Morton v. 
5
 Justice Kennedy concurred because, under the facts presented, the defendants 
"established no meaningful tie or connection to the owner, the owner's home, or the 
7 
United States. 734 A.2d 178, 180 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Carter. 525 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring)) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, when using Carter to determine 
standing, it is important to read the plurality because "five Members of the Court would 
place under the Fourth Amendment's shield, at least, 'almost all social guests."1 Carter. 
525 U.S. at 109 n. 2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Carter. 525 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring)): see also United States v. Higgins. 282 F.3d 1261, 1271 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(concluding that Carter must be analyzed in light of Justice Kennedy's concurrence 
where he concluded that nonovernight, social guests generally have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy); InreB.R.K.. 658 N.W.2d 565, 575 (Minn. 2003) (noting that 
courts must consider Justice Kennedy's concurrence because it was ,fthe deciding vote11); 
State v. Ortiz. 618 N.W.2d 556, 560 (Iowa 2000) ("In deciding the present case, we must 
be mindful of [Justice Kennedy's] concurring opinion, as well as the plurality opinion, 
because, without Justice Kennedy's concurrence, the Court's finding of no reasonable 
expectation of privacy would not have prevailed."). Thus, under Carter 's plurality, Earl's 
standing under the Fourth Amendment is even stronger because most, if not all, social 
guests have standing. 
3. At the Very Least, Earl Has Standing To Challenge the Search of the 
Backpack Because He Owned the Backpack. 
The State argues the officers were justified in searching Earl's backpack without a 
owner's expectation of privacy." Minnesota v. Carter. 525 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
8 
warrant because Earl "manifested] no expectation of privacy in the backpack" and the 
officers had Allen's consent to search the apartment. Aple. Brf. at 18. However, these 
arguments fail because Earl did manifest an expectation of privacy in the backpack. 
First, the State claims Earl manifested no expectation of privacy because he left 
the backpack in the livingroom. See. Aple. Brf. at 18. To support this argument, the 
State cites United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1989), for the idea 
that an expectation of privacy is tenuous in the common areas of an apartment. See id. 
However, Burnett is distinguishable from this case. In Burnett, the defendant was a 
casual visitor who left drugs in an open bag that did not belong to him in the hallway 
while he was in the bedroom. See. Burnett, 890 F.2d at 1238-39. Conversely, in this 
case, Earl was not a casual visitor but an overnight or social guest. See Sections A(l)-(2) 
above. Further, he was the backpack's sole owner, was careful to keep it closed, and did 
not leave it unattended with his other belongings but brought it to the livingroom where 
he could keep an eye on it from the kitchen. See. R. 278:22, 61. 
Second, the State claims Earl manifested no expectation of privacy in the 
backpack because he denied ownership of the backpack. See Aple. Brf. at 19. However, 
Earl did not deny ownership of the backpack until after the backpack had been searched. 
See R. 277:13. Earl was never given the opportunity to claim ownership of the backpack 
before it was searched. See R. 278:59. Rather, he was given the opportunity after the 
officers searched the backpack, found paraphernalia, and mirandized him so he knew 
9 
claiming ownership would only provide the State evidence with which to convict him. 
See R. 278:36: 277:13: see also United States v. Garzon. 119 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (holding defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in bag, even though 
he left it on bus, because he was not given opportunity to claim ownership before 
search). 
Third, the State claims Earl did not manifest an expectation of privacy because he 
did not assert ownership of the backpack when the officers asked Allen for consent to 
search the apartment. See Aple. Brf. at 18-19. However, contrary to the State's 
assertion, it is not reasonable to assume Earl heard the officers ask Allen for consent. 
See id. at 19 n. 11. There is no evidence in the record to show Earl was present when the 
officers asked Allen for consent and, absent evidence to support this assertion, it cannot 
be assumed simply because the men present in the apartment were ordered out of the 
apartment at the same time. See, e.g., Tisco Intermountain & State Ins. Fund v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 744 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Utah 1987) (holding "it cannot be assumed that facts 
exist1' in the absence of evidence). 
B. THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE BACKPACK DURING THE 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST WAS INADMISSIBLE FRUIT OF THE 
POISONOUS TREE 
The State argues this Court should affirm the trial court's holding that the search 
of Earl's backpack was a valid search incident to arrest because the issue was not 
preserved for appeal and the officers were justified in searching Earl's backpack incident 
10 
to arrest. See Aple. Brf. at 8, 11. However, the State's argument fails because: (1) the 
issue was properly preserved for appeal, and (2) the evidence seized incident to arrest 
was inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree because it was tainted by the illegal entry. 
1. This Issue Was Properly Preserved for Appeal. 
The State argues this Court should not consider whether the evidence seized from 
Earl's backpack during the search incident to arrest was inadmissible fruit of the 
poisonous tree because the issue was not preserved for appeal. See Aple. Brf. at 11. 
However, this argument fails because Earl did properly preserve the issue. See State v. 
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 460 (Utah 1994) (holding Msome form of specific preservation of 
claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will 
review such a claim on appeal" (quotations and citation omitted)); Ray v. State, 798 So. 
2d 579 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (holding defendant's argument that officer exceeded 
authority of search incident to arrest was preserved, even though defendant did not 
specifically discuss in motion to suppress, because motion "covered all of the contraband 
that was discovered in the search"). 
Here, Earl moved the trial court to suppress all evidence seized at the apartment. 
See R. 33. In arguing the motion, both parties discussed whether the officers were 
justified in searching Earl's backpack incident to arrest. See id. at 46, 65. Specifically, 
Earl argued the search incident to arrest was unlawful because, "[otherwise, police could 
always search homes without warrants, arrest people inside if they found any evidence of 
11 
crimes, and then continue searching 'incident to arrest.'" R. at 65-66. After considering 
these arguments, the trial court denied Earl's motion because, among other things, the 
search of Earl's backpack was "lawful incident to his arrest." See_ id. at 132. 
Accordingly, Earl pleaded guilty and reserved "his right to appeal the denial of his 
motion to suppress." See id at 235.6 
2. The Search of EaiTs Backpack Should Be Excluded As Fruit of the 
Poisonous Tree Because It Was Achieved Through Illegal Entry. 
The State argues this Court should reject Earl's argument that the reasonableness 
of an officer's search incident to arrest should be considered when the arrest and search 
are achieved through illegal entry because it was already rejected in United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and it would not further the deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule. See Aple. Brf. at 11-13. However, this Court should apply a 
reasonableness test to searches incident to arrest when the arrest was obtained through 
illegal entry because: (1) Robinson is inapplicable, and (2) a reasonableness test will 
achieve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
First, Robinson is not applicable because it does not address how the taint of a 
6
 In this case, neither of the policy reasons for requiring preservation apply. 
Preservation is required because: (1) "the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to 
address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and (2) "a defendant should not be 
permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of enhancing] the defendant's 
chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,.. . claiming] on appeal that the Court 
should reverse." State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 14^11, 10 P.3d 346 (quotations and 
citations omitted) (alterations in original). Here, Earl readily brought the issue to the trial 
court's attention and the trial court considered and addressed the claimed error. See R. 
46,65,132. 
12 
prior illegality affects searches incident to arrest. In Robinson, the Court held no 
reasonableness test is required when deciding whether a search incident to arrest is valid. 
Robinson. 414 U.S. at 234-35. However, it did not address whether a reasonableness test 
is required when the search incident to arrest is tainted by prior illegality. In this case, 
Earl does not argue the search incident to arrest was invalid under Robinson . Rather, he 
argues the evidence seized during the search should be excluded as fruit of the poisonous 
tree because the search was tainted by the illegal entry and was not so reasonable as to 
cure the taint. Accordingly, Robinson is not applicable. 
Second, this Court should use a reasonableness test to determine the effect a prior 
illegality has on searches incident to arrest because a reasonableness test would deter 
police illegality.7 An intervening criminal act permits an officer who illegally enters a 
premises to arrest a defendant. See State v. Griego. 933 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). However, it does not automatically terminate the applicability of the exclusionary 
rule that attached at the illegal entry. See State v. Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289, 292 
(Utah 1995) (determining an intervening act nullifies the exclusionary rule only if 
"excluding the evidence will [not] effectively deter future illegalities"). Rather, the 
7
 This issue has not yet been addressed in Utah. The State argues the Utah 
Supreme Court chose not to adopt a reasonableness test where the search incident to 
arrest follows an illegality in State v. Trane. 2002 UT 97, 57 P.3d 1052. See. Aple. Brf. 
at 12 n. 8. However, in Trane, the parties did not argue a reasonableness requirement 
should be imposed and there was no need for the Court to consider it because the search 
incident to arrest was obviously reasonable since the defendant confronted the officers 
with threats and physical violence. See Trane, 2002 UT 97 at ffl[4-9, 22 n. 3. 
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exclusionary rule will continue to apply until "the detrimental consequences of illegal 
police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no 
longer justifies its cost." Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
In the case of a search incident to arrest, the exclusionary consequence of prior 
illegality ceases to deter, not when the officer is rewarded for his illegal actions by 
obtaining a lawful arrest, but when he develops a reasonable fear of danger or destruction 
of evidence that justifies a search incident to that arrest.8 Cf. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 
460, 470 (Utah 1990) (holding officers are justified in searching without a warrant when 
necessary to "protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction of 
evidence"); State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("The need for an 
immediate search must be apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh the 
important protection of individual rights provided by the warrant requirement."). 
8
 A reasonableness test would also serve other purposes of the exclusionary rule. 
One purpose of the exclusionary rule is to "prevent making a court a 'party to lawless 
invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental 
use of the fruits of such invasions.'" State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990) 
(citation omitted). Allowing trial courts to use a reasonableness test to decide whether a 
search incident to arrest was conducted to dispel fear or to abuse a prior illegality would 
prevent them from becoming accomplices to governmental illegality. 
Another purpose of the exclusionary rule is assure citizens "that the government 
w[ill] not profit from its lawless behavior." United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338, 357 
(1974) (Brennan, J. dissenting). Allowing a trial court to consider reasonableness would 
assure the public that the government does not automatically use evidence seized through 
illegality, but only uses evidence if it was reasonably seized for fear of safety or 
destruction of evidence. 
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Further, although the State argues a reasonableness test would not deter police 
illegality because it is "highly improbable" an officer "would act illegally in the hope that 
a suspect would commit an intervening offense," Aple. Brf. at 12-13, a reasonableness 
test would deter illegality because there are several simple ways an officer can secure a 
lawful arrest after illegally gaining access to a person.9 
For example, after illegally gaining access to a person, an officer can leam the 
identity of the person and arrest him for outstanding warrants. See, e.g.. Frierson v. 
State. No. 4D02-1875, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 8291, at *20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 4, 
2003) (holding search incident to arrest for outstanding warrants invalid because officer 
illegally stopped defendant); State v. Ford. 778 N.E.2d 642, 680 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) 
(same); State v. DeArman. 774 P.2d 1247, 1249-50 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (same). 
Similarly, after illegally gaining access to a person, an officer can ask him about 
identification and arrest him for lying about or failing to carry identification. See, e.g.. 
Vollmer v. State. 337 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (holding search 
incident to arrest for lying about name invalid because officer illegally stopped 
defendant); State v. Gagnon. 817 So. 2d 167, 171 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (holding search 
incident to arrest for driving without valid driver's license invalid because officer 
9
 There are also many rewards for obtaining an arrest if the officer is then allowed 
to search without reasonable fear because the authority granted in a search incident to 
arrest is very broad. See, e.g.. State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 784-85 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (holding bag search after defendant handcuffed and placed in patrol car was valid). 
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illegally stopped defendant).10 In other words, 
if evidence is not excluded when it is found as a result of an 
arrest that is, itself, at least triggered by . . . an unlawful 
search and seizure, then police have open season, limited only 
by the prospect of civil suits for civil rights violations, to 
conduct sweeps, stopping dozens, or hundreds, of persons, 
without any particularized suspicion, in the hope of catching 
a few persons who are subject to outstanding arrest warrants 
[or who commit intervening crimes in response to the 
officer's illegal action]. 
Ford. 778 N.E.2d at 680. 
In this case, the search incident to arrest was conducted without a reasonable fear 
of danger or destruction of evidence. See. Aplt. Brf. at 44-46. Accordingly, the evidence 
seized from Earl's backpack in the search incident to arrest should be excluded as fruit of 
the poisonous tree because his arrest was achieved through illegality and the incident 
search was not reasonable so as to sever the exclusionary effect of the illegal entry. 
10
 Notably, each of the cases cited here involve illegal stops outside the home. 
Whereas, in this case, the officers illegally entered a private residence. Illegally entering 
a home is a much greater intrusion than illegally stopping a person on the street. See, 
e.g.. State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (explaining that "a person has a 
lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home"); State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 
1, 432 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1967) (noting the core of the Fourth Amendment is "the right of 
a man to retreat into his home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion"). Accordingly, as evidenced in this case, an officer is even more likely to 
frighten a person into committing an intervening crime when he enters the person's home 
than when he detains the person on the street. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's decision to deny Earl's motion to 
suppress evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
SUBMITTED this 7** day of July, 2003. 
L^STsEPPf 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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